WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
An excerpt from a footnote in my article on George Washington's preparation for peace and war in 1783.
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, on September 27, 1781, in Robert A. Rutland, ed. The Papers of George Mason, vol.2 (Chapel Hill 1970), 697-699, George Mason expressed his great displeasure with, and suspicion of, the Confederated Congress’ seemingly ambitious intentions to settle the western territories, especially in Virginia. Revenues Congress would derive from western territories were to be set aside to pay the national debt. Mason identified an issue of congressional jurisdiction. The integrity of state borders insured sovereignty. Mason asked Jefferson if he had “been informed of the factious, illegal, & dangerous schemes now in Contemplation in Congress, for dismembering the Commonwealth of Virginia, & erecting a new State or States to the Westward of the Alleghany Mountains.” It was unconscionable, Mason thought, that Congress even contemplated such an expansive power. Mason’s interpretation of the Articles of Confederation led him to believe Congress did not posses the authority to enact such legislative measures. The power Mason identified was “directly contrary to the Articles of Confederation.” It was a power that had a propensity to become a pernicious doctrine over time. Mason claimed that the power was “assumed upon the Doctrine now industriously propagated ‘that the late Revolution has transferred the Sovereignty formerly possessed by Great Britain, to the United States, that is to the American Congress’ A Doctrine which, if not immediately arrested in it’s progress, will be productive of every Evil; and the Revolution, instead of securing, as was intended, our Rights & Libertys, will only change the Name & place of Residence of our Tyrants.” Mason thought Congress was working under false assumptions. It seems as though Mason identified the problem of implied and explicit powers. At an early stage, Mason was worried about a grand conspiracy moving the Confederated Congress against State sovereignty and liberty. Mason jokingly mentioned that he would “not have troubled” the busy Virginia Delegate to Congress, “but that I apprehended in the late Confusions, & sudden Removals of public, as well as private Papers, the Articles of Confederation may have been sent to some distant Place.” Mason connected the devaluation and curious disappearance of paper currency with depreciable parchment. It was a matter of public trust, confidence, and integrity. It “will prove that Congress” was “arrogating to themselves an unwarrantable & dangerous Power; which is in its Nature subversive of American Liberty; for if they can stride over the Lines of the Confederation, & assume Rights not delegated to them by the Legislatures of the different States, in one instance, they can in every other that the Lust of power may suggest.” The existence of the states as independent sovereign jurisdictions was at stake.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Friday, February 19, 2010
Personal Privacy and the Law 1886
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
The following is an excerpt from my article on personal privacy.
The first time the Supreme Court of the United States elaborated on a concept of personal privacy was in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). On June 22, 1874, Congress sought to strengthen existing revenue laws. The legal issue in Boyd focused on the fifth section of the 1874 act, which gave rise to a Fourth and Fifth Amendment controversy. Language used in the section required defendants or claimants in revenue cases, on behalf of a written motion by a U.S. Attorney, and by the discretion of the court, to produce private books, invoices, and papers, pertaining to violations of revenue laws. Any items obtained in such a manner would serve as evidence in future criminal proceedings (Boyd, 619-620).The respondent in Boyd allegedly subverted the payment of duties when he fraudulently doctored invoices to obtain thirty-five cases of imported plate glass (617). On February 1, 1886, Joseph P. Bradley, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1870-1892), delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Bradley expressed the idea that the problems raised in Boyd posed “a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen” (618).
The court in Boyd drew a direct connection between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and amalgamated them into one comprehensive conception of personal privacy. Both Amendments, Bradley asserted, were connected because unreasonable searches and seizures “are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself” (633). The seemingly compulsive nature of the fifth section of the disputed statute was not just in conflict with the Fifth Amendment. Bradley linked the two Amendments close together by merely stating the act of compulsion described in the Fifth Amendment “is equivalent of a search and seizure – and an unreasonable search and seizure – within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” (635). This judicial interpretation of the Amendments refurbished and invigorated the text, and increased individual liberties for citizens.
Bradley extensively quoted from English case law to add color to his argument. He drew from legal concepts expressed in the 1765 landmark decision pronounced by Lord Camden in Entrick v. Carrington. Lord Camden’s opinion, Bradley noted for the court, delineated civil liberties that
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and personal property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgement. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgement. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other (630).
Bradley defined a sphere of personal security that was profoundly expansive. He further explained that courts must try to prevent the “unconstitutional practices” of “silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure…by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed” (635). Bradley intimated that the judiciary was an active participant in the defense of personal security. The language of the Fourth Amendment did not receive an extensive review prior to Boyd. Bradley’s liberal construction enhanced the importance and scope of what constituted a reasonable search and seizure, a victory for individual liberty and the rule of law.
Concurring with the decision in Boyd, Associate Justice Samuel Miller (1862-1890), also joined by Chief Justice Morrison Waite (1874-1888), duly noted “[t]here is in fact no search and no seizure authorized” in section five of the 1874 act (639). Miller agreed with the court’s opinion that “the effect of the act of Congress is to compel the party on whom the order of the court is served to be a witness against himself” (639), but his concurrence sounds more like a dissent. Miller explicitly refuted Bradley’s interpretation of the statute.
Nothing in the nature of a search is here hinted at. Nor is there any seizure, because the party is not required at any time to part with the custody of the papers. They are to be produced in court, and, when produced, the United States attorney is permitted, under the direction of the court, to make examination in presence of the claimant. And may offer in evidence such entries in the books, invoices, or papers as relate to the issue. The act is careful to say that “the owner of said books and papers, his agent or attorney, shall have, subject to the order of the court, the custody of them, except pending their examination in court as aforesaid (640).
Miller saw a real problem with Bradley’s interpretation of the legislation. Justice Miller thought the statute in question did not contain a compulsory order to produce books and papers, which did not abridge constitutional safeguards. Miller was alarmed that Bradley expanded the notion of what constituted a reasonable search:
if the mere service of a notice to produce a paper to be used as evidence, which the party can obey or not as he chooses is a search, then a change has taken place in the meaning of words, which has not come within my reading, and which I think was unknown at the time the Constitution was made. The searches meant by the Constitution were such as led to seizure when the search was successful. But the statute in this case uses language carefully framed to forbid any seizure under it (641).
Bradley, on the other hand, agreed in part that the 1874 act “only requires the defendant or claimant to produce them,” but if the defendant “does not produce them, the allegations which it is affirmed they will prove shall be taken as confessed,” which is “tantamount to compelling their production” (621-622).
The following is an excerpt from my article on personal privacy.
The first time the Supreme Court of the United States elaborated on a concept of personal privacy was in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). On June 22, 1874, Congress sought to strengthen existing revenue laws. The legal issue in Boyd focused on the fifth section of the 1874 act, which gave rise to a Fourth and Fifth Amendment controversy. Language used in the section required defendants or claimants in revenue cases, on behalf of a written motion by a U.S. Attorney, and by the discretion of the court, to produce private books, invoices, and papers, pertaining to violations of revenue laws. Any items obtained in such a manner would serve as evidence in future criminal proceedings (Boyd, 619-620).The respondent in Boyd allegedly subverted the payment of duties when he fraudulently doctored invoices to obtain thirty-five cases of imported plate glass (617). On February 1, 1886, Joseph P. Bradley, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1870-1892), delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Bradley expressed the idea that the problems raised in Boyd posed “a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen” (618).
The court in Boyd drew a direct connection between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and amalgamated them into one comprehensive conception of personal privacy. Both Amendments, Bradley asserted, were connected because unreasonable searches and seizures “are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself” (633). The seemingly compulsive nature of the fifth section of the disputed statute was not just in conflict with the Fifth Amendment. Bradley linked the two Amendments close together by merely stating the act of compulsion described in the Fifth Amendment “is equivalent of a search and seizure – and an unreasonable search and seizure – within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” (635). This judicial interpretation of the Amendments refurbished and invigorated the text, and increased individual liberties for citizens.
Bradley extensively quoted from English case law to add color to his argument. He drew from legal concepts expressed in the 1765 landmark decision pronounced by Lord Camden in Entrick v. Carrington. Lord Camden’s opinion, Bradley noted for the court, delineated civil liberties that
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and personal property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, - it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgement. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgement. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other (630).
Bradley defined a sphere of personal security that was profoundly expansive. He further explained that courts must try to prevent the “unconstitutional practices” of “silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure…by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed” (635). Bradley intimated that the judiciary was an active participant in the defense of personal security. The language of the Fourth Amendment did not receive an extensive review prior to Boyd. Bradley’s liberal construction enhanced the importance and scope of what constituted a reasonable search and seizure, a victory for individual liberty and the rule of law.
Concurring with the decision in Boyd, Associate Justice Samuel Miller (1862-1890), also joined by Chief Justice Morrison Waite (1874-1888), duly noted “[t]here is in fact no search and no seizure authorized” in section five of the 1874 act (639). Miller agreed with the court’s opinion that “the effect of the act of Congress is to compel the party on whom the order of the court is served to be a witness against himself” (639), but his concurrence sounds more like a dissent. Miller explicitly refuted Bradley’s interpretation of the statute.
Nothing in the nature of a search is here hinted at. Nor is there any seizure, because the party is not required at any time to part with the custody of the papers. They are to be produced in court, and, when produced, the United States attorney is permitted, under the direction of the court, to make examination in presence of the claimant. And may offer in evidence such entries in the books, invoices, or papers as relate to the issue. The act is careful to say that “the owner of said books and papers, his agent or attorney, shall have, subject to the order of the court, the custody of them, except pending their examination in court as aforesaid (640).
Miller saw a real problem with Bradley’s interpretation of the legislation. Justice Miller thought the statute in question did not contain a compulsory order to produce books and papers, which did not abridge constitutional safeguards. Miller was alarmed that Bradley expanded the notion of what constituted a reasonable search:
if the mere service of a notice to produce a paper to be used as evidence, which the party can obey or not as he chooses is a search, then a change has taken place in the meaning of words, which has not come within my reading, and which I think was unknown at the time the Constitution was made. The searches meant by the Constitution were such as led to seizure when the search was successful. But the statute in this case uses language carefully framed to forbid any seizure under it (641).
Bradley, on the other hand, agreed in part that the 1874 act “only requires the defendant or claimant to produce them,” but if the defendant “does not produce them, the allegations which it is affirmed they will prove shall be taken as confessed,” which is “tantamount to compelling their production” (621-622).
Thursday, February 18, 2010
A Letter from George Mason to Patrick Henry
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
A footnote from my article on George Washington's preparation for another military campaign in 1783.
In a letter from George Mason to Patrick Henry, May 6, 1783, reprinted in Robert A. Rutland, ed. The Papers of George Mason, vol.2 (Chapel Hill 1970), 769-773, Mason warned Henry of the dangers a powerful Congress posed to state sovereignty. As George Washington beseeched Congress, states, and citizens thereof, to expand congressional power, his fellow Virginian expressed outrage at Congress' ambitious intentions. Mason thought Congress assumed too much power and showed contempt for the Articles of Confederation. He perceived the benefits of the revolution, and the nation's image, was jeopardized by the Confederated Congress. Congress' jurisdiction had to be explicit and curtailed. Sovereign states were a bastion of liberty. Mason confessed his uncertainty to Henry, "We are now to rank among the Nations of the World: but whether our Independence shall prove a Blessing or a Curse, must depend upon our own Wisdom or Folly, Virtue or Wickedness; judging of the future from the Past, the Prospect is not promising." Both Mason and Washington placed great importance on a virtuous and respectable international image, as well as recognizing the country's uncertain future. Washington wanted Congress, the states, and citizens to take the initiative and attend to their national duties. Mason's view was that Congress ought to show deference to the states, as Washington pleaded with numerous parties to prepare for the possibility of another military campaign in 1783, even though peace was in the air. "A Depravity of Manners & Morals," Mason exclaimed, existed in the general assembly. "The Confidence and Reverence," he passionately decreed, "in the People for the Legislature" was "so greatly impaired by a contrary Conduct; and without which, our Laws can never be much more than a dead-Letter." Congress' problem, as Mason perceived it, was that it expanded the boundaries proscribed by the Articles of Confederation. Congress' lack of respect for the laws and state governments marked an unwarranted ambition. That ambition was quite apparent to Mason, who mentioned a curious rumor floating around for paranoid ears to capture. The Confederated Congress, it seemed to Mason, "intend[ed] to dissolve themselves, in order to make way for a General Convention, to new-model the Constitution of Government. Will such a Caprice of future Assemblys may repeat it, from time to time, until the Stability of the Constitution is totally destroyed, and Anarchy introduced in its Stead." The integrity of the law was paramount to both Washington and Mason. Washington viewed Congress as a stagnant branch needing more vigor. Mason, on the other hand, viewed Congress as an unduly assertive assembly dangerously exceeding its constitutional boundaries. This dispute raged as Washington tried to impress upon the nation that a dual policy of peace and war must be entertained, even though the rays of peace were breaking through the storm clouds.
A footnote from my article on George Washington's preparation for another military campaign in 1783.
In a letter from George Mason to Patrick Henry, May 6, 1783, reprinted in Robert A. Rutland, ed. The Papers of George Mason, vol.2 (Chapel Hill 1970), 769-773, Mason warned Henry of the dangers a powerful Congress posed to state sovereignty. As George Washington beseeched Congress, states, and citizens thereof, to expand congressional power, his fellow Virginian expressed outrage at Congress' ambitious intentions. Mason thought Congress assumed too much power and showed contempt for the Articles of Confederation. He perceived the benefits of the revolution, and the nation's image, was jeopardized by the Confederated Congress. Congress' jurisdiction had to be explicit and curtailed. Sovereign states were a bastion of liberty. Mason confessed his uncertainty to Henry, "We are now to rank among the Nations of the World: but whether our Independence shall prove a Blessing or a Curse, must depend upon our own Wisdom or Folly, Virtue or Wickedness; judging of the future from the Past, the Prospect is not promising." Both Mason and Washington placed great importance on a virtuous and respectable international image, as well as recognizing the country's uncertain future. Washington wanted Congress, the states, and citizens to take the initiative and attend to their national duties. Mason's view was that Congress ought to show deference to the states, as Washington pleaded with numerous parties to prepare for the possibility of another military campaign in 1783, even though peace was in the air. "A Depravity of Manners & Morals," Mason exclaimed, existed in the general assembly. "The Confidence and Reverence," he passionately decreed, "in the People for the Legislature" was "so greatly impaired by a contrary Conduct; and without which, our Laws can never be much more than a dead-Letter." Congress' problem, as Mason perceived it, was that it expanded the boundaries proscribed by the Articles of Confederation. Congress' lack of respect for the laws and state governments marked an unwarranted ambition. That ambition was quite apparent to Mason, who mentioned a curious rumor floating around for paranoid ears to capture. The Confederated Congress, it seemed to Mason, "intend[ed] to dissolve themselves, in order to make way for a General Convention, to new-model the Constitution of Government. Will such a Caprice of future Assemblys may repeat it, from time to time, until the Stability of the Constitution is totally destroyed, and Anarchy introduced in its Stead." The integrity of the law was paramount to both Washington and Mason. Washington viewed Congress as a stagnant branch needing more vigor. Mason, on the other hand, viewed Congress as an unduly assertive assembly dangerously exceeding its constitutional boundaries. This dispute raged as Washington tried to impress upon the nation that a dual policy of peace and war must be entertained, even though the rays of peace were breaking through the storm clouds.
Monday, February 15, 2010
A History of the Reception Clause
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
An excerpt of my article on the History of the Reception Clause of the U.S. Constitution
In September 1792, Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, wrote a lengthy letter to President George Washington explaining that the Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, entertained dangerous designs to subvert the very essence of Republican government. This letter highlighted the political dissention plaguing Washington's cabinet and the nation. Hamilton's "system flowed from principles adverse to liberty," Jefferson exclaimed to the President, "and was calculated to undermine and demolish the Republic, by creating an influence of his department over the members of the Legislature."19 Jefferson further claimed, with regard to French and English commercial policies, that
my system was to give some satisfactory distinctions to the former, of little cost to us, in return for the solid advantages yielded us by them; and to have met the English with some restrictions which might induce them to abate their severities against our commerce.20
Jefferson adamantly despised Great Britain's commercial depredations of American trade, which Hamilton seemingly favored. Hamilton "has forced down his own system," the secretary passionately noted, which was "inconsistent with the honor and interest of our country."21 In Jefferson's view, Hamilton was too involved with the policies under the State Department's purview, and "stepped farthest into the control of the department of the other."22 The dispute was centered on the seperation of power doctrine, and the sphere of influence of departments over certain federal operations and policies.
Washington's administration faced significant problems in April 1793, commercial trade, especially involving the West Indies, the revolutionary debt the United States owed France, internal political dissention, coupled with the murderous turmoil associated with France's Reign of Terror. In a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, Hamilton clearly delineated the major foreign policy dilemmas confronting the United States in regard to the French Question. On April 9, 1793, one day after Edmond Charles Genet, newly appointed French Minster to the United States, arrived in South Carolina, Hamilton addressed the issue of whether the Minister should be received by the United States. The Treasury Secretary asked Jay
[i]f we receive a Minister from the Republic, shall we be afterwards at liberty to say - We will not decide whether there is a Government in France competent to demand from us the performance of the existing treaties. What the Government in France shall be is the very point in dispute. 'Till that is decided the applicability of the Treaties is suspended. When that Government is established we shall consider whether such changes have been made as to render their continuance incompatible with the interest of the U States.23
Hamilton suggested that the instability of France's government should induce the United States to change its foreign policy posture. "I am of the opinion," Hamilton confidently remarked, "that we have at least a right to hold the thing suspended till the point in dispute is decided."24 The revolutionary war debt the United States...
19 Andrew A. Lipscomb, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C., 1903) vVIII.,397.
20 Ibid., 398.
21 Ibid., 399.
22 Ibid.
23 Harold C. Syrett, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1969), vXIV, 297.
24 Ibid.
An excerpt of my article on the History of the Reception Clause of the U.S. Constitution
In September 1792, Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, wrote a lengthy letter to President George Washington explaining that the Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, entertained dangerous designs to subvert the very essence of Republican government. This letter highlighted the political dissention plaguing Washington's cabinet and the nation. Hamilton's "system flowed from principles adverse to liberty," Jefferson exclaimed to the President, "and was calculated to undermine and demolish the Republic, by creating an influence of his department over the members of the Legislature."19 Jefferson further claimed, with regard to French and English commercial policies, that
my system was to give some satisfactory distinctions to the former, of little cost to us, in return for the solid advantages yielded us by them; and to have met the English with some restrictions which might induce them to abate their severities against our commerce.20
Jefferson adamantly despised Great Britain's commercial depredations of American trade, which Hamilton seemingly favored. Hamilton "has forced down his own system," the secretary passionately noted, which was "inconsistent with the honor and interest of our country."21 In Jefferson's view, Hamilton was too involved with the policies under the State Department's purview, and "stepped farthest into the control of the department of the other."22 The dispute was centered on the seperation of power doctrine, and the sphere of influence of departments over certain federal operations and policies.
Washington's administration faced significant problems in April 1793, commercial trade, especially involving the West Indies, the revolutionary debt the United States owed France, internal political dissention, coupled with the murderous turmoil associated with France's Reign of Terror. In a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, Hamilton clearly delineated the major foreign policy dilemmas confronting the United States in regard to the French Question. On April 9, 1793, one day after Edmond Charles Genet, newly appointed French Minster to the United States, arrived in South Carolina, Hamilton addressed the issue of whether the Minister should be received by the United States. The Treasury Secretary asked Jay
[i]f we receive a Minister from the Republic, shall we be afterwards at liberty to say - We will not decide whether there is a Government in France competent to demand from us the performance of the existing treaties. What the Government in France shall be is the very point in dispute. 'Till that is decided the applicability of the Treaties is suspended. When that Government is established we shall consider whether such changes have been made as to render their continuance incompatible with the interest of the U States.23
Hamilton suggested that the instability of France's government should induce the United States to change its foreign policy posture. "I am of the opinion," Hamilton confidently remarked, "that we have at least a right to hold the thing suspended till the point in dispute is decided."24 The revolutionary war debt the United States...
19 Andrew A. Lipscomb, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C., 1903) vVIII.,397.
20 Ibid., 398.
21 Ibid., 399.
22 Ibid.
23 Harold C. Syrett, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1969), vXIV, 297.
24 Ibid.
President Truman's Palestine Policy - 1945 Part II
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
Another excerpt from my article on the Recognition of Israel.
On the same day that Truman announced the creation of the Palestine Committee, the White House made public a letter to British Prime Minister Attlee. In it, Truman stressed his contention that "granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria."40 Truman vigorously pressured the British to let Jews migrate to Palestine. "[N]o other single matter is so important," Truman fervently professed, then "for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps" to "be permitted to resettle" in Palestine.41 The letter was filled with dreary reminders of German atrocities - as if the Prime Minister was not aware of the horrific atrocities committed. "No claim is more meritorious," the President ardently proposed, "than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement."42 The Chief Diplomat was a strong and sympathetic advocate for minority rights and the future of Jewish resettlement in Palestine. The president's Wilsonian character was stern. It was not purely political, but politics were certainly intertwined with policy, as it usually is. Truman's policy on Palestine was formed and expressed well before any election. The president was either idealistically sincere, or cynically crafting a political issue to use in the elections of 1946 and 1948; the former should be given more weight than dissimulation on Truman's account.
At the beginning of a press conference on November 20, 1945, the president announced a change in the Army command. During the conference, a reporter made the observation that there was peace "but it is still not peace."43 Truman had a lengthy answer for the reporter who then postulated, "[h]ave something for the people to shoot at?"44 "Well, it isn't a matter of being something for the people to shoot at," Truman pedantically replied, "[i]t is for the establishment of world peace."45 The prior week, Truman poignantly reminded the reporters, the conference took a momentous "first step toward implementing the United Nations Organization." This "will be the fundamental organization," Truman assured them, "through which we can get peace in the world."46 That democratic institution was a remaking of Wilson's initial League of Nations vision, which could be a proper venue for the Palestine question, and similar international disputes, to be peacefully resolved. On that same November day, former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a letter to the president. In it, she astutely analyzed the Palestine situation and Jewish plight in general. Eleanor told Harry that she was "distressed that Great Britain has made us take a share in another investigation of the few Jews remaining in Europe."47 If only other nations had taken some refugees, Roosevelt paternalistically noted, "we would not have to continue to have on our consciences the deaths of at least fifty of those poor creatures daily."48 Mrs. Roosevelt's disdain for the British was clear. She shrewdly remarked, "I object very much to being used by them."49 Mrs. Roosevelt did make the crucial observation, though, that "[t]he question between Palestine and the Arabs, of course, has always been complicated by oil deposits, and I suppose it always will."50 Truman addressed Mrs. Roosevelt's concerns in a letter a few days later. Truman was "very hopeful" that something peaceful work out in Palestine that would "be of lasting benefit."51 He optimistically maintained "we expect to continue to do what we can to get as many Jews as possible into Palestine as quickly as possible, pending any final settlement."52 Mrs. Roosevelt and President Truman's sentiments were aligned, and both were deeply concerned about the future of displaced Jews, fully conscious of the intricate complexities surrounding, what Dean Acheson called, an "international puzzle."
40 Reid, Public Papers of the Presidents, 470.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 494.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Steve Neal, Eleanor and Harry (New York, 2002), 46.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 48.
52 Ibid.
Another excerpt from my article on the Recognition of Israel.
On the same day that Truman announced the creation of the Palestine Committee, the White House made public a letter to British Prime Minister Attlee. In it, Truman stressed his contention that "granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria."40 Truman vigorously pressured the British to let Jews migrate to Palestine. "[N]o other single matter is so important," Truman fervently professed, then "for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps" to "be permitted to resettle" in Palestine.41 The letter was filled with dreary reminders of German atrocities - as if the Prime Minister was not aware of the horrific atrocities committed. "No claim is more meritorious," the President ardently proposed, "than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement."42 The Chief Diplomat was a strong and sympathetic advocate for minority rights and the future of Jewish resettlement in Palestine. The president's Wilsonian character was stern. It was not purely political, but politics were certainly intertwined with policy, as it usually is. Truman's policy on Palestine was formed and expressed well before any election. The president was either idealistically sincere, or cynically crafting a political issue to use in the elections of 1946 and 1948; the former should be given more weight than dissimulation on Truman's account.
At the beginning of a press conference on November 20, 1945, the president announced a change in the Army command. During the conference, a reporter made the observation that there was peace "but it is still not peace."43 Truman had a lengthy answer for the reporter who then postulated, "[h]ave something for the people to shoot at?"44 "Well, it isn't a matter of being something for the people to shoot at," Truman pedantically replied, "[i]t is for the establishment of world peace."45 The prior week, Truman poignantly reminded the reporters, the conference took a momentous "first step toward implementing the United Nations Organization." This "will be the fundamental organization," Truman assured them, "through which we can get peace in the world."46 That democratic institution was a remaking of Wilson's initial League of Nations vision, which could be a proper venue for the Palestine question, and similar international disputes, to be peacefully resolved. On that same November day, former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a letter to the president. In it, she astutely analyzed the Palestine situation and Jewish plight in general. Eleanor told Harry that she was "distressed that Great Britain has made us take a share in another investigation of the few Jews remaining in Europe."47 If only other nations had taken some refugees, Roosevelt paternalistically noted, "we would not have to continue to have on our consciences the deaths of at least fifty of those poor creatures daily."48 Mrs. Roosevelt's disdain for the British was clear. She shrewdly remarked, "I object very much to being used by them."49 Mrs. Roosevelt did make the crucial observation, though, that "[t]he question between Palestine and the Arabs, of course, has always been complicated by oil deposits, and I suppose it always will."50 Truman addressed Mrs. Roosevelt's concerns in a letter a few days later. Truman was "very hopeful" that something peaceful work out in Palestine that would "be of lasting benefit."51 He optimistically maintained "we expect to continue to do what we can to get as many Jews as possible into Palestine as quickly as possible, pending any final settlement."52 Mrs. Roosevelt and President Truman's sentiments were aligned, and both were deeply concerned about the future of displaced Jews, fully conscious of the intricate complexities surrounding, what Dean Acheson called, an "international puzzle."
40 Reid, Public Papers of the Presidents, 470.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 494.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Steve Neal, Eleanor and Harry (New York, 2002), 46.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 48.
52 Ibid.
President Truman's Palestine Policy - 1945
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
An excerpt from my article on the Recognition of Israel.
On Thursday, August 16, 1945, shortly after returning from Potsdam, Germany, United States President Harry Truman gathered the White House press corps in his office for a mid-morning news conference. The president was in a chipper mood. He jokingly told the eager reporters "you hadn't all had a chance to look me in the face or ask me any impertinent questions." Laughter from the news corps broke out, as the president wryly smiled, then further aroused his attentive audience's humor by adding that there was nothing "that you would break your arms to get out of the door for this morning." As the festive greeting and hardy laughs eased down, more serious business began. After a few questions concerning the future of the Manhattan project, V-J Day, and General Douglas MacArthur's surrender terms with the Japanese, a reporter asked if there was "[a]nything about the Jewish national state discussed at Potsdam?" Truman candidly disclosed that he "discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee, and [was] still discussing it." A follow-up question beckoned from another Washington scribbler, "not with Stalin?" The president casually replied, "No, there was nothing he could do about it." Truman isolated Stalin and the Soviet Union by downplaying their significance as an important influence in the Near East. Great Britain was the nation necessary to secure a peaceful path in a strategic region. President Truman adeptly handled a variety of other questions peppered to him by the ravenous press corps.
Toward the end of the press conference, an inquisitive reporter could not leave until the president could at least elaborate a bit more about a Jewish national state. The correspondent wanted to pin the president down on a direct policy position, and further asked "[w]hat was the American view on Palestine at Berlin?" Truman realistically asserted that American foreign policy toward Palestine was primarily concerned with letting "as many Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country." President Truman, and several other administration officials, were seriously concerned about exacerbating the humanitarian situation with uninhibited mass migration into Palestine. The President also announced that the situation would "have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs." "[I]f a state can be set up there," the president cautiously advanced, "they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis." Optimism about a peaceful settlement of a Jewish state in Palestine was sincere and pragmatic. Truman recognized and appreciated the innumerable unforeseen ramifications surrounding such a noble endeavor, while delicately maneuvering through the seemingly innocuous and "impertinent" questions. President Truman's diplomatic willingness to publically back the possibility of a Jewish national state, with certain conditions, was an act of national clarity on policy, and, given cold war constructs, security. The Chief Diplomat maintained that the United States had "no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine." Truman, acting in his constitutional authority as Chief Diplomat, altered U.S. policy toward Palestine during that seemingly innocuous media session. The President utilized an informal press conference to delineate policy parameters regarding Palestine. From the earliest stages of the Truman administration, Jewish immigration, a future Jewish state, and cold war intrigues were important issues driving the president's policy considerations, not political expediency.
Warren R. Reid, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1961), 224-26, 228.
An excerpt from my article on the Recognition of Israel.
On Thursday, August 16, 1945, shortly after returning from Potsdam, Germany, United States President Harry Truman gathered the White House press corps in his office for a mid-morning news conference. The president was in a chipper mood. He jokingly told the eager reporters "you hadn't all had a chance to look me in the face or ask me any impertinent questions." Laughter from the news corps broke out, as the president wryly smiled, then further aroused his attentive audience's humor by adding that there was nothing "that you would break your arms to get out of the door for this morning." As the festive greeting and hardy laughs eased down, more serious business began. After a few questions concerning the future of the Manhattan project, V-J Day, and General Douglas MacArthur's surrender terms with the Japanese, a reporter asked if there was "[a]nything about the Jewish national state discussed at Potsdam?" Truman candidly disclosed that he "discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee, and [was] still discussing it." A follow-up question beckoned from another Washington scribbler, "not with Stalin?" The president casually replied, "No, there was nothing he could do about it." Truman isolated Stalin and the Soviet Union by downplaying their significance as an important influence in the Near East. Great Britain was the nation necessary to secure a peaceful path in a strategic region. President Truman adeptly handled a variety of other questions peppered to him by the ravenous press corps.
Toward the end of the press conference, an inquisitive reporter could not leave until the president could at least elaborate a bit more about a Jewish national state. The correspondent wanted to pin the president down on a direct policy position, and further asked "[w]hat was the American view on Palestine at Berlin?" Truman realistically asserted that American foreign policy toward Palestine was primarily concerned with letting "as many Jews into Palestine as it is possible to let into that country." President Truman, and several other administration officials, were seriously concerned about exacerbating the humanitarian situation with uninhibited mass migration into Palestine. The President also announced that the situation would "have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs." "[I]f a state can be set up there," the president cautiously advanced, "they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis." Optimism about a peaceful settlement of a Jewish state in Palestine was sincere and pragmatic. Truman recognized and appreciated the innumerable unforeseen ramifications surrounding such a noble endeavor, while delicately maneuvering through the seemingly innocuous and "impertinent" questions. President Truman's diplomatic willingness to publically back the possibility of a Jewish national state, with certain conditions, was an act of national clarity on policy, and, given cold war constructs, security. The Chief Diplomat maintained that the United States had "no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine." Truman, acting in his constitutional authority as Chief Diplomat, altered U.S. policy toward Palestine during that seemingly innocuous media session. The President utilized an informal press conference to delineate policy parameters regarding Palestine. From the earliest stages of the Truman administration, Jewish immigration, a future Jewish state, and cold war intrigues were important issues driving the president's policy considerations, not political expediency.
Warren R. Reid, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1961), 224-26, 228.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Extreme Liberalism Is a Threat to Liberty
WARNING: Do not break the law before, during, or after reading anything I mention.
Liberty is a liberal notion, and moderate forces must prevail in tempering its intensity. All too often humans are succumbed by intemperate passions that unduly influence perceptions and actions. The extremes of liberalism manifest themselves in two distinct ways. One extreme is either too liberal and the other is not liberal enough. The former is excessively liberal in matters of perceptions and conceptions, and the latter is excessively deficient in the same respects. A majority of human beings are moderately liberal in nature, and have a desire to acquire more freedom, security, and happiness in a temperate manner. Extremes of liberalism are far from the moderate stream of normal behavior. Individuals either reduce their liberalness or increase it. For those who are too liberal, they seem to want to do all things for all people, and expect others to follow in that line of thinking. There are also those who are not liberal enough, and exhibit the same stubbornness, but are narrow-minded individuals with parochial views. Both extremes are righteously indignant to each other and the more moderate sentiments. Given that the extremes are really minority sentiments, they should not be as influential as they currently are. It seems as if American citizens, the vast majority moderately liberal in nature, according to the present description, should not be torn apart by the radical extremes that hamper domestic tranquility.
No matter what the party label, in this country’s political history, the fundamental question vexing every citizen is how much power we grant the Federal government, and what is the extent of it, according to the United States Constitution. Both the major political party’s, in recent history, have come down on either side of this fundamental question perpetually facing American citizens. The Democratic Party has the notion that the Federal government should do more, for more, with more, and the Republican Party is the exact opposite. The problem with the two party system is that there are extreme forces at work in each. The base in each party are really extremes that exert too much influence given its minority representation. It is a shame that only 60% of American citizens vote, given the close nature of political contests. The other 40% could push the slim majorities in either way, giving more legitimacy to our national voice. The extremes need to be banished from the two major party's, and forced to become independent entities, with their own structure, and their own candidates, and not continue to infect the more moderate forces by hiding in the two party's. The influential extremes of liberalism must be diminshed in order to move this country forward in the 21st century.
Liberty is a liberal notion, and moderate forces must prevail in tempering its intensity. All too often humans are succumbed by intemperate passions that unduly influence perceptions and actions. The extremes of liberalism manifest themselves in two distinct ways. One extreme is either too liberal and the other is not liberal enough. The former is excessively liberal in matters of perceptions and conceptions, and the latter is excessively deficient in the same respects. A majority of human beings are moderately liberal in nature, and have a desire to acquire more freedom, security, and happiness in a temperate manner. Extremes of liberalism are far from the moderate stream of normal behavior. Individuals either reduce their liberalness or increase it. For those who are too liberal, they seem to want to do all things for all people, and expect others to follow in that line of thinking. There are also those who are not liberal enough, and exhibit the same stubbornness, but are narrow-minded individuals with parochial views. Both extremes are righteously indignant to each other and the more moderate sentiments. Given that the extremes are really minority sentiments, they should not be as influential as they currently are. It seems as if American citizens, the vast majority moderately liberal in nature, according to the present description, should not be torn apart by the radical extremes that hamper domestic tranquility.
No matter what the party label, in this country’s political history, the fundamental question vexing every citizen is how much power we grant the Federal government, and what is the extent of it, according to the United States Constitution. Both the major political party’s, in recent history, have come down on either side of this fundamental question perpetually facing American citizens. The Democratic Party has the notion that the Federal government should do more, for more, with more, and the Republican Party is the exact opposite. The problem with the two party system is that there are extreme forces at work in each. The base in each party are really extremes that exert too much influence given its minority representation. It is a shame that only 60% of American citizens vote, given the close nature of political contests. The other 40% could push the slim majorities in either way, giving more legitimacy to our national voice. The extremes need to be banished from the two major party's, and forced to become independent entities, with their own structure, and their own candidates, and not continue to infect the more moderate forces by hiding in the two party's. The influential extremes of liberalism must be diminshed in order to move this country forward in the 21st century.
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